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The Financial Crisis, the European Union
Institutional Order, and Constitutional
Responsibility
PAUL CRAIG*
ABSTRACT

The financial crisis sent shock waves throughout the European
Union, the effects of which are still being felt. This article focuses on the
institutional dimension of the crisis, and examines its impact on the
relationship between the member states and the European Union, and
between the organs of the European Union itself. The analysis is
undertaken from a temporal perspective. It begins with consideration of
the treaty provisions that shaped the balance of power within the
European Union, and who bears the primary responsibilityfor this form
of institutional ordering. It is argued that while there is a very
considerable literature on democracy deficit in the European Union,
there has been neglect of the constitutional responsibility that member
states bear for the institutional status quo. The nature of this
constitutional responsibility is elaborated in the first section of the
article. This is followed by discussion of the shaping of the Treaty
provisions concerning economic and monetary union, and the way in
which these bear the imprint of the choices made by the member states as
to the degree of intrusion into national economic governance by the
European Union that they were willing to accept. The penultimate
section of the article considers the role played by the different EU
institutions during the crisis as it unfolded, and this is followed in the
final section by evaluation of the interinstitutionalconsequences of the
measures adopted to meet the crisis.

* Professor of English law, St. John's College, University of Oxford. An earlier
version of this article was given at the FIDE Conference in Copenhagen in 2014, and at
Conferences in Tilburg and the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I am grateful
for comments received at the Conferences and for those from Federico Fabbrini.
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INTRODUCTION

The financial crisis is arguably the most significant challenge to the
European Union since the inception of the European Economic
Community (EEC). It has generated an array of political, legal, and
institutional responses, the complexity of which is daunting in itself.
This article considers these developments and places them within a
broader frame of institutional concerns, thereby facilitating thought
about their impact on issues that have been debated more generally
within the European Union. The analysis has two principal themes for
the choices made, institutional design and constitutional responsibility.
These twin themes are considered in temporal perspective.
The discussion begins with the foundational institutional
architecture for EU decision making and the debates that this has
generated about democracy deficit. There has been a further resurgence
of these concerns in light of the crisis. While this is unsurprising, there
is nonetheless a surprising lack of discourse as to responsibility for the
status quo and an equally surprising lack of serious discussion as to how
we should think of the constitutional responsibility of member states
and not just the European Union itself for the current institutional
ordering.
The analysis then shifts to the institutional architecture of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) laid down in the Maastricht
Treaty, with the focus once again on the relationship between the
institutional attribution of power, constitutional responsibility for the
shaping of these provisions, and the way in which the schema
contributed to the subsequent economic malaise. This article will also
explore the relationship between this institutional schema and
subsidiarity.
The penultimate section of the article considers the institutional
schema that was used to deal with the financial crisis while it unfolded
and the extent to which this can be properly portrayed in
intergovernmental or supranational terms. The focus of the final section
of the article is on the measures that have been put in place thus far,
and the institutional implications that this has had for the balance of
power, both vertical and horizontal.
I. EU INSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

It is unsurprising that the financial crisis should have brought back
to the fore concerns about the very design of the EU's institutional
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structure and issues of democracy deficit,' on which there is already
extensive literature. 2 This, however, is matched by an equal dearth of
literature concerning constitutional responsibility of member states for
the status quo. Consideration of the causal influences underpinning
treaty reform has not been matched by attendant analysis of what this
should be taken to connote in terms of the constitutional responsibility
of member states for the resultant institutional architecture. This is a
serious failing.
The fact that far-reaching measures were enacted pursuant to the
Lisbon Treaty, and through treaties such as the Fiscal Compact and the

1. See, e.g., Olaf Cramme & Sara B. Hobolt, A European Union Under Stress, in
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN A EUROPEAN UNION UNDER STRESS 1, 2-3 (Olaf Cramme & Sara
B. Hobolt eds., 2015); THE EUROPEAN UNION: DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES IN TIMES OF CRISIS (Simona Piattoni ed., forthcoming

2015); Kalypso Nicolaidis, European Demoicracy and Its Crisis, 51 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
351, 351 (2013); Damian Chalmers, Democratic Self-Government in Europe: Domestic
Solutions to the EU Legitimacy Crisis, POLICY NETWORK at 3 (May 2013),
http://www.policy-network.netlpublications download.aspx?ID=8362.
2. See, e.g., SVEIN S. ANDERSEN & KJELL A. ELIASSEN, Introduction: Dilemmas,
Contradictions and the Future of European Democracy, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: How
DEMOCRATIC IS IT? 1, 1-5 (Svein S. Andersen & Kjell A. Eliassen eds., 1996) (establishing,

among other things, the need for European countries to find workable solutions to the
problem of democratic legitimacy in the EU); Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione,
Introduction: Constitutions and Politics to CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION:
EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 1- 4 (Richard Bellamy and Dario

Castiglione eds., 1996) (analyzing a number of aspects regarding the transformation of
constitutionalism in Europe); Jacques Delors, Foreword to CLUB OF FLORENCE, EUROPE:
THE IMPOSSIBLE STATUS Quo vii - xiii (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1997) (discussing ways of
reinforcing democratic legitimacy); DEIRDRE M. CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 41-49 (1997) (establishing the

consequences of a democratic deficit scenario); Soledad Garcia, Europe's Fragmented
Identities and the Frontiers of Citizenship, in EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR
LEGITIMACY 1 (Soledad Garcia ed., 1993) (establishing that Europe's renewed search for
its identity is a consequence, among other reasons, of its need to be legitimate by the rest
of the world in the context of a global economic transformation); Jack Hayward, Preface to
THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE 1, 2 (Jack Hayward ed., 1995) (reflecting the

problems posed by pursuing European integration in a context of economic recession);
MICHAEL NEWMAN, Introduction to DEMOCRATIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 1-11 (Catherine Hoskyns & Michael Newman eds., 2000)

(considering whether the democratization of the EU is an appropriate aim); A CITIZENS'
EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER (Allan Rosas & Esko Antola eds., 1995) (discussing
the concept of a citizens' Europe from both a legal and a political science point of view);
Wolfgang Streeck, Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?, in
CONSTITUTIONAL

DIMENSIONS

OF EUROPEAN

ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION

229, 229-239

(Francis Snyder ed., 1996) (reflecting on the institutional structure of the EU and the
consequences this has on social policy); J. H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE:
"Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION 3, 77-86 (1999) (discussing the challenges of democracy and legitimacy).
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European Stability Mechanism, to cope with the financial crisis has led
to renewed attention on the democratic credentials of the European
Union. There already exists a very considerable body of literature
dealing with such matters, and there is no intent to traverse this ground
in detail here again. Suffice it to say that the disjunction between power
and electoral accountability is the most potent aspect of the democracy
3
deficit argument.
It is axiomatic within national systems that the voters can express
their dislike of the incumbent party through periodic elections.
Governments can be changed if they incur electoral displeasure. In the
European Union, legislative power is divided between the Council,
European Parliament, and Commission, with the European Council
playing a significant role in shaping the overall legislative agenda. The
fact that different modes of representation pertain in these institutions
is not in itself odd, given that this is a standard feature of many federaltype polities. 4 However, past voters have had no direct way of signifying
their desire for change in the legislative agenda. European elections can
alter the complexion of the European Parliament, but it is only one part
of the legislative process. The Commission, Council, and European
Council have input into the legislative agenda, but they cannot be voted
out by the people. The European Parliament's influence over the choice
of the Commission President has increased, as has the electoral
accountability of the incumbent to this office, an issue to which we shall
return below. Suffice it to say for the present that this alleviates, but
does not cure the problem, in part because the other Commissioners
remain national government appointees, and in part because the
European Parliament's power in this respect does not touch the
considerable role played by the Council and European Council in the EU
decision-making process.

3. See

Generally Kalypso

Nicolaidis,

The Idea of European Demoicracy, in

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAw 247 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos

Eleftheriadis eds., 2012) (providing an account of the origins of federalism and
"demoicracy" in the EU); J.H.H. Weiler, Ulrich R. Haltern & Franz C. Mayer, European
Democracy and Its Critique, in THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE, supra note 2;
Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a DemocraticDeficit in the EU: A Response
to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533 (2006) (disagreeing about the
lack of democratic deficit in the EU argued by Moravcsik); Kalypso Nicolaidis, Our
European Demoi-cracy: Is this Constitution a third way for Europe?, in WHOSE EUROPE?
NATIONAL MODELS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

137, 138-141

(Kalypso Nicolaidis & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2003).
4. See Generally R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND
REGULATORY POLITICS IN THE EU AND BEYOND (2004) (overviewing the structure of

regulatory federalism in the European Union and other governments).
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There have been various attempts to address this concern. For
some, such as Moravcsik, the response is to affirm political
accountability, notwithstanding the absence of direct electoral
accountability analogous to national legal regimes-the argument being
that "constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via
national governments, and the increasing powers of the European
Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy making is, in nearly
all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the
demands of European citizens." 5 This in turn has been contested by
others who regard electoral accountability as central to conceptions of
democracy. Checks and balances are indeed part of the standard fare of
democratic politics, but the justification for democracy at its most
fundamental is that it allows participatory input to determine the
6
values on which people within that polity should live.
It is noteworthy that the discourse concerning democracy deficit is
normally presented as a critique of the European Union. It is the EU
qua real and reified entity that suffers from this infirmity, the corollary
being that blame is cast on it. The European Union is, of course, not
blameless in this respect, but nor are the member states, when viewed
collectively and individually. The present disposition of EU institutional
power is the result of successive treaties in which the principal players
have been the member states. There may well be debate as to the
relative degree of power wielded by member states and the EU
institutions in the shaping and application of EU legislation, but there
is greater consensus on the fact that member states tend to dominate at
times of Treaty reform. 7 The interinstitutional distribution of power is

5. Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 'DemocraticDeficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in
the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 605 (2002).
6. See Follesdal & Hix, supra note 3, at 533-534; Weiler et al., supra note 3.
7. See generally GARY MARKS ET AL., GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996);
ANDREW MORAVCSIK, NATIONAL PREFERENCE FORMATION AND INTERSTATE BARGAINING IN

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1955-1986 (1992) (Marks and Moravcsik disagree about the
degree of power wielded by Member States and EU institutions in the legislative process,
but generally agree that the former dominate at times of Treaty reform); James A
Caporaso, The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or PostModern?, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 29 (1996); Jonathan Golub, State Power and
Institutional Influence in European Integration: Lessons from the Packaging Waste
Directive, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 313 (1996) (exploring the ongoing debate between
state centric models, and an EU where power is given to supranational authorities); Gary
Marks, Liesbet Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: StateCentric v. Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 341 (1996); Andrew
Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional
Statecraft in the European Community, 45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991) (describing the period of
pro-European integration in the late 1980s and 1990s); Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences
and Power in the European Community: A Liberal IntergovernmentalistApproach, 31 J.
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the result of hard fought battles, the results of which are embodied in
Treaty amendment. Thus, insofar as the present arrangements divide
EU policy making de facto and de jure between the Commission,
Council, European Parliament, and European Council, this reflects
power balances that the member states shaped and were willing to
accept. This is readily apparent when considering the initial Rome
Treaty and any of the five major treaty reforms since then. It is
powerfully exemplified by the debates concerning institutional reforms
in the Constitutional Treaty, which were then taken over into the
Lisbon Treaty.8 Most notably, it was evident in the battle as to whether
the European Union should have a single president who would be
located in the Commission, or whether a reinforced European Council
should also have a long-term president. 9 It was apparent in the debates
as to Council configurations and who would chair them. It was the
frame within which the discourse took place concerning the number of
Commissioners and the method of choosing them.10
This point can be reinforced by considering the reforms that would
be required to alleviate the democratic deficit. The European
Parliament has been further empowered by the Lisbon Treaty through
an extension of what is now the ordinary legislative procedure to new
areas, and its greater control over the appointment of the Commission
President than hitherto. Thus, while the European Council retains
ultimate power over the choice of Commission President,'" it will not
force a candidate on the European Parliament that is of a radically
different persuasion from the dominant party or coalition. A formal
linkage between the dominant party or coalition in the European

COMMON MKT. STUD. 473 (1993) (looking at the evolution of the European community into
a successful intra-governmental institution, and the bargains that facilitated the process);
Thomas Risse-Kappen, Exploring the Nature of the Beast: InternationalRelations Theory
and ComparativePolicy Analysis Meet the European Union, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 53
(1996) (discussing the work needed for a successful EU integration); Fritz W. Scharpf,
Introduction: the Problem-Solving Capacity of Multi-level Governance, 4 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 520 (1997) (examining the factors that lead to the development of effective national
and supranational regulatory systems); Mark A. Pollack, Abstract, InternationalRelations
Theory and European Integration (Robert Schuman Ctr. For Advanced Stud., RSC No.
2000/55, 2000) (arguing that the rationalist approach had become the dominant approach
to the study of European integration in international relations theory).
8. See generally PETER NORMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION: THE MAKING OF

EUROPE'S CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (2d ed. 2005) (describing how debates among Member
States shaped institutional reform in the Constitutional Treaty).
9. See PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 81-82

(2010).
10. See id. at 92-97.
11. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 17(7), Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU].
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Parliament and the appointment of the Commission President serves to
strengthen the connection between policy and party politics, thereby
alleviating the disjunction of political power and political responsibility
that has underpinned previous critiques of the European Union. This
link was further strengthened in the 2014 elections for the European
Parliament (EP), in which rival candidates for the Commission
Presidency campaigned openly as the chosen candidates of the two
principal political groupings in the EP. 12 The electoral success of the
center-right European People's Party led to Jean-Claude Juncker's
confirmation as the new Commission President, albeit after opposition
from the United Kingdom and Hungary. The general consensus is that
now that this stronger link between the EP and the Commission
President has been forged, it will constitute the new status quo going
forward and establish the ground rules for subsequent EP elections. The
hope is that it will also increase voter interest in EU elections, since
they can perceive a more proximate connection between the casting of
their vote and the policy choices carried forward after the election.
This may well be so in relative terms, but nonetheless there are
obstacles that subsist to a closer link between policy and politics in the
European Union, even after the Lisbon Treaty reforms and changes
wrought by the 2014 EP elections. The EU policy agenda is not
exclusively in the hands of the European Parliament or the
Commission. The Council and the European Council have input both de
jure and de facto. Thus, even if the European Parliament and
Commission President are closely allied in terms of substantive policy
for the European Union, the policy that emerges will necessarily also
bear the imprint of the political vision of the Council and European
Council. Moreover, while the president of the Commission may well be
primus interpares, he or she is still only one member of the Commission
team. The other Commissioners will not necessarily be of the same
political persuasion as the president or the dominant party in the
European Parliament.
It would be possible in theory to have a regime in which the people
voted directly for two constituent parts of the legislature, the European
Parliament and Council, and for the President of the Commission and
the President of the European Council. It would be possible in theory to
have the previous package, but only a single elected president for the
European Union as a whole. The political reality is that radical change
of this kind has not happened because the member states were
12. Jean-Claude Juncker, Candidate for President of the European Commission, A
New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change,
Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session (July 15, 2014),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/ priorities/docs/pg en.pdf.
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unwilling to accept such a disposition of power. It is certainly true that
the choice between two presidents and a single president for the
European Union was debated during the negotiations leading to the
Constitutional Treaty. It is equally true that discourse concerning the
election of the Commission President began in the 1980s. It should
nonetheless be recognized that the broader reforms set out above were
not on the political agenda during the extensive negotiations concerning
institutional power in 2003-2004 during the deliberations that led to
the Constitutional Treaty, nor in the subsequent discussions that
culminated in the Lisbon Treaty. Even if the broader package of reforms
were adopted, it could not ensure that the people would exercise
electoral control over the direction of EU policy, since the European
Council would still be populated by Heads of State, who would continue
to have a marked influence over the policy agenda, and members of the
Commission, with diverse political views, would still be chosen by the
member states.
Moreover, there is a Catch 22 lurking here that is both
constitutional and political. The constitutional manifestation flows from
the realization that the diminution of state power in the Council and the
European Council that would be entailed by such change would not be
constitutionally tolerated in some countries and would lead to the
charge that the European Union was truly becoming a superstate. It
would be regarded as constitutionally unacceptable in some member
states, which would regard such change as undermining the status of
the member states as masters of the Treaty, and installing in its place a
federal state that was incompatible with the founding precepts in the
constituent documents of those member states.
The political manifestation of the Catch 22 is equally important.
Changes of the kind adumbrated above would be opposed by many
national parliaments, as well as national executives, which would not
view with equanimity the diminution of their status that flowed from
the increased legitimacy of the EU political order. This leads to the
further paradox that because such changes that would alleviate the
democratic deficit would not prove acceptable to national political
orders, the discourse focuses on ever stronger ways to involve the
national parliaments in decision making through suggestions of red
cards to complement the existing color set. I am not opposed to
involvement of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process.
They have a role therein, although its nature and limits are contestable.
The implications of proposals for parliamentary red cards would be
problematic, and this is a fortiori so for radical proposals that would
give individual member states the power to opt out of legislation that
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they felt to be unduly burdensome. 13 The apposite point for present
purposes, however, is that the very drive for such involvement is
premised on the assumption that it will thereby indirectly alleviate the
EU's democratic malaise, in circumstances where other ways of
attaining this end would be opposed by many national parliamentary
institutions.
The political manifestation of the Catch 22 is also apparent in more
subtle ways. Thus, recent efforts by Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude
Juncker to imbue the choice of Commission President with more
electoral legitimacy, through direct campaigning combined with
televised debate, proved successful in the sense that the candidate of the
party that secured most seats in the EP was duly appointed as
Commission President. 14 This outcome was not certain, however, and
some responded by reasserting the formal right for member states to
choose another candidate. The truth of this as a matter of formal treaty
law is not open to question. Rather, it was the almost "reflexive"
reaction in some quarters, whereby shifts toward some greater measure
of direct electoral legitimacy provoked a counter reaction, reasserting
Member State power as exercised through the European Council in the
choice of Commission President.
I return then to the inquiry posed earlier concerning the dearth of
consideration of what the current disposition of power means in terms of
Member State constitutional responsibility, connoting in this respect
both their responsibility qua contracting parties to the European Union
and the constitutional responsibility they bear in relation to their own
constitutional order. I am not referring to this insofar as it concerns
national representatives in the Council, or that of heads of state within
the European Council, on which there is indeed considerable discussion.
I am referring rather to the way in which we think more generally about
the constitutional responsibility of member states both as contracting
parties to the European Union and in terms of their respective
constitutional orders. It is the very nature of the obligations that flow
from the legal maxim pacta sunt servanda that are of interest here. It
may be helpful to contrast two perspectives in this regard.
It might be argued that there are no distinctly political obligations
that can be cast in terms of Member State constitutional responsibility,
and that the legal dimension of pacta sunt servanda exhausts the
meaning of this precept. It might also be contended in this vein that
member states make treaties, and legislation pursuant thereto, out of
rational self-interest to maximize their personal benefit and minimize
13. See Chalmers, supranote 1, at 5-6.
14. President (2014-2019) Jean-Claude Juncker, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.
eulcommission/2014-2019/president-en (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
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attendant costs with the consequence that if they can offload
responsibility for EU difficulties "elsewhere," they will. Member State
constitutional responsibility is regarded as coterminous with legal
accountability narrowly construed. The state accepts the consequences
of noncompliance with EU legislation, whether cast in terms of state
liability in damages, Commission action for breach of EU law, or direct
effect of directives. This is however conceived for what it is: legal
accountability when one breaks the rules. It does not undermine the
foundational precept that the state will act as a rational actor seeking to
maximize the returns and minimize the costs of EU membership. It is
integral to this approach that the state will regard it as politically
"natural" and normatively "uncontroversial" to offload blame for failures
to the European Union itself, rather than accept that the states
individually or collectively bear responsibility in this regard. The
rational state actor as thus conceived describes not only how states
behave in relation to the European Union, but also how states set the
normative boundaries for their constitutional responsibility.
Member State constitutional responsibility might, alternatively, be
conceptualized more broadly to include and go beyond the limits of legal
accountability. Let us leave aside for the present the issue of how far the
picture in the preceding paragraph captures the reality of state
behavior. The salient point for present purposes is that there is no a
priori reason why this rationalist version of state action should
translate into or dominate thought about the responsibility of state
choices conceived in constitutional terms. Indeed, there are very good
reasons why it should not, since it thereby denudes the concept of
responsibility of almost all meaning with generally more detrimental
consequences for how we conceive of political responsibility. A richer
conception of constitutional responsibility flows in part from the
obligation of sincere cooperation embedded in the Treaty, 15 and in part
from more general precepts of taking responsibility for one's action that
should, as a matter of principle, pertain equally to states and to
individuals, as a matter of domestic constitutional principle.
The principle of sincere cooperation, whereby it is incumbent on the
European Union and member states in full mutual respect to assist each
other in carrying out tasks that flow from the Treaties, is central to this
alternative vision. 16 So too is the remainder of this Treaty provision,
which enjoins the member states to take any appropriate measure to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or
resulting from acts of the EU institutions, and requires member states

15. TEU art. 4(3).
16. Id.
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to facilitate achievement of the EU's tasks and refrain from any
7
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the EU's objectives.1
This Treaty obligation may provide the foundation for more discrete
legal obligations, as exemplified by its deployment in the jurisprudence
on state liability in damages.18 It is, however, integral to this alternative
vision that the legal dimension of the principle of sincere cooperation
does not exhaust Member State constitutional responsibility.
It also has a distinctly political dimension that is expressive most
fundamentally of the positive side of the maxim pacta sunt servanda,
irrespective of whether it is capable of being embodied in a legally
enforceable norm. 19 Thus, the principle of sincere cooperation surely
provides the basis for an obligation of good faith political engagement by
member states in ensuring that treaty obligations are fulfilled
efficaciously; the injunction on member states to take any appropriate
measure to ensure fulfillment of treaty obligations should generate
responsibility for states to be proactive in thinking about the best way
to achieve treaty imperatives; and the duty to refrain from behavior
that could jeopardize attainment of EU objectives should provide the
foundation for constitutional responsibility not to offload blame to the
European Union when this is unwarranted.
What this means most fundamentally is that member states bear
responsibility for the choices that they have made, individually and
collectively, in shaping EU decision making. Thus, insofar as there is a
democratic deficit of the kind considered above, responsibility cannot
simply be "offloaded" by the member states to the European Union.
Member states cannot carp about deficiencies of EU decision making as
if they were unconnected with the architecture thus created. Moreover,
they cannot criticize aspects of the existing decision-making process as
imperfectly democratic-such as the method of representation in the
European Parliament-without, at the very least, being mindful of the
fact that they would reject more far reaching democratic reforms on the
ground that they would thereby transform the European Union into
something more akin to a federal state.
It might be contended by way of response that talk of constitutional
responsibility is inapt because individual member states may disagree
with the solutions embodied in the Treaty, but may be pressured to
accept them by more powerful states. The legal reality, however, is that
the Treaty establishes twenty-eight veto points, given that unanimity is
17. Id.
18. Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5413-16.
19. What has been termed here "the positive side of pacta sunt servanda" may have
legal implications. The point being made here is that even if this is not so there may still
be the foundations for political obligation and constitutional responsibility.
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required for Treaty amendment. It can be accepted that in the European
Union, as with any other collective grouping, there is never going to be
parity judged in terms of substantive influence or power with the
consequence that there may be pressure to accept a particular solution.
To contend that this can be used to deny any or all constitutional
responsibility for the Treaty outcome is nonetheless a non sequitur. It
would mean according states some open-ended trump to excuse them
from their ratification of the Treaty amendment without any inquiry as
to the nature of the alleged pressure they were subjected to and without
inquiry as to whether they should have withstood it and exercised their
veto if they felt that strongly about the issue. The same applies a fortiori
in relation to legislation made under the Treaty. A particular state may
well disagree with some aspects of EU legislation enacted under the
ordinary legislative procedure. That is inevitable in a collective entity.
However, all states signed up to the rules of the game, which include
commitment to qualified majority decision making, not unanimity, in
the ordinary legislative procedure. It is central, moreover, to the very
idea of collective action that states forego some element of individual
choice for the benefit of being part of the club.
Recognition of Member State constitutional responsibility also has
broader implications for discourse concerning related issues, such as
social legitimacy. 20 Joseph Weiler is surely right that the European
Union is presently suffering a social legitimacy deficit, manifest in low
voter turnout and the rise of more anti-EU parties. 2 1 The causes of this
deficit are complex, but the failure to articulate any developed
conception of Member State constitutional responsibility for their
actions-whether concerning the EU's overall decision-making
architecture or individual decisions made pursuant thereto-is
assuredly a factor in this regard. It should come as scant surprise that
such a deficit exists if member states are allowed to avoid constitutional
responsibility for the direct effects of their own actions and offload
blame on to the "other," even more so when they direct critical barbs at
the European Union, while being cognizant that they would reject most
changes that could address some of the root causes of the critique. It
should equally come as no surprise that more extreme parties follow the
lead of mainstream parties in this respect, which should not be
forgotten when engaging in the political soul-searching for causes of the
recent EP election results.
20. See Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy in the Eurozone: Can Integration and
Democracy Be Reconciled?, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY
CONSTRAINTS 379 (Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini & Pierre Larouche eds., 2014).
21. J.H.H. Weiler, Europe in Crisis-On 'PoliticalMessianism, 'Legitimacy' and the
'Rule of Law, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 248, 253, 255 (2012).
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The blame for failure to acknowledge such a conception of
responsibility resides not just with the states themselves, but also with
the broader community, including the academic community. We should,
to be sure, continue to subject the EU political ordering to critical
scrutiny. In doing so, we should also reflect on the rationale for the
current disposition of power, what alternatives are feasible, and which
players set the limits in this respect. The accepted critical discourse on
the EU's political ordering is, in reality, only telling half of the story,
thereby ignoring conceptions of Member State constitutional
responsibility that are central to a rounded understanding of the status
quo and viable reform options. The nature and scope of this
constitutional responsibility requires further elaboration. It is
important to stress at this juncture that the preceding analysis concerns
only the nature of such responsibility as it attaches to the member
states collectively and individually for the overall institutional
architecture of the European Union.
II.

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Member State constitutional responsibility is also relevant in
relation to the substantive Treaty provisions that frame economic and
monetary union. There is little doubt that the European Union bears
some responsibility for the financial crisis, but so too do the member
states, both collectively and individually. The treaty provisions on
economic and monetary union were crafted in the Maastricht Treaty.
Insofar as there was an asymmetry between EU power over monetary
(as opposed to economic) union, this reflected what member states were
willing to accept. This is readily apparent when one considers the
architecture of the EMU Treaty provisions and the Stability and Growth
22
Pact.
Monetary union was centered on possessing a single currency. The
Treaty articles were powerfully influenced by German ordo-liberal
economic thought, which demanded independence of the European
Central Bank, governance by experts, and the primacy of price stability.
These foundational precepts were embodied in the primary Treaty
articles. 23 It was integral to the Maastricht settlement that monetary
22. See Council Regulation 1466/97, On the Strengthening of the Surveillance of
Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997
O.J. (L 209) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 1467/97, On Speeding Up and Clarifying the
Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6 (EC).
23. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts.
127, 130, 282(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
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policy was Europeanized. This schema was reinforced by the Lisbon
Treaty provisions on competence, which stated that monetary policy for
those countries that subscribed to the euro was within the exclusive
competence of the European Union. 24 This was further strengthened by
mandatory treaty provisions precluding instructions or interference
from any outside party, whether that was a nation state or another EU
25
institution.
The Maastricht settlement in relation to economic policy was
markedly different. It was built on two related assumptions:
preservation of national authority and preservation of national liability.
The former was reflected in the fact that member states retained fiscal
authority for national budgets, subject to limited oversight and
coordination from the EU designed to persuade them, with the ultimate
possibility of sanctions, to balance their budgets and not run excessive
deficits. The latter, preservation of national liability, was the quid pro
quo for the former, which found its most powerful expression in the no
bailout provision. 26 While there was some limited qualification to this
precept, 27 the message was nonetheless that national governments
retained authority over national economic policy, subject to the treaty
rules designed to persuade them to balance their budgets; the corollary
being that if they did not do so then the consequential liabilities would
remain at the door of the nation state.
Member State unwillingness to subscribe to the rules weakened
oversight of national economic policy in subsequent years, which led to
their modification and resulted in the weakening of centralized EU
control. 28 The Maastricht "deal" was nonetheless left largely unaltered
in the Lisbon Treaty. The member states recognized the proximate
connection between economic and monetary policy. They understood
that the economic health of individual Member State economies could
have a marked impact on the valuation of the euro, hence the need for
some oversight and coordination of national economic policy. The states
were, however, mindful of the policy decisions made in and through
national budgets, including those of a redistributive nature, and were

24. TFEU art. 2(1), 3.
25. TFEU art. 130.
26. See TFEU art. 125(1).
27. TFEU art. 122(2).
28. See Case C-27/04, Comm'n v. Council, 2004 E.C.R. 1-6649; Regulation 1056/2005, of
the European Council of 27 June 2005 Amending Council Regulation 1467/97, 2005 O.J. (L
174) 5; Regulation 1055/2005, of the European Council of 27 June 2005 Amending Council
Regulation 1466/97, 2005 O.J. (L 174) 1; Imelda Maher, Economic Policy Coordinationand
the European Court: Excessive Deficits and ECOFIN Discretion, 29 EUR. L. REV. 831
(2004) (explaining the background and significance of Case C-27/04).
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unwilling to accord the European Union too much control over such
determinations.
It was only when the financial crisis hit the European Union that
the member states were willing to accept that greater control over
national economic policy was a necessary condition for monetary union.
This led to the plethora of measures enacted to tighten centralized
control over national budgets and national banks through the six-pack,
the two-pack, and the Fiscal Compact. While the European Union
should properly be held accountable for the way in which it dealt with
the financial crisis, the member states cannot escape responsibility in
this regard. The states had a major role in shaping the Maastricht
architecture on the EMU and in determining how it was applied in the
years thereafter.
There is indeed a certain gentle irony in the fact that the Maastricht
Treaty contained the new provisions on EMU and on subsidiarity. The
irony does not reside in the fact that the former was legally predicated
on the latter. This was, of course, not so in technical legal terms. The
Maastricht Treaty embodied the powers on the EMU that the member
states were willing to give to the European Union. These were contained
in the primary Treaty provisions and, thus, were not themselves subject
to subsidiarity, which was designed to determine whether rules would
be made at the EU level under the primary Treaty provisions that
existed. Therefore, subsidiarity, as now expressed in Article 5(3) TEU,
did not bite on the initial choice of what power member states should
give to the European Union in relation to the EMU. This formal point
concerning subsidiarity should not mask the reality that the choice as to
what powers member states were willing to sign over to the European
Union in relation to economic union was shaped substantively by
subsidiarity, in the sense that it was felt right that major decisions
concerning fiscal sovereignty should properly remain with the member
states, subject to limited oversight by the European Union.
It is here that the irony resides. While subsidiarity may express a
powerful and laudable sentiment about the locus of decision making, the
reality is that it can, and often does, lead to regulatory failure. The EU's
financial crisis is testimony to two of the most prominent instances of
such regulatory failure, which played out in relation to both the
sovereign debt and banking crises. The sovereign debt crisis was
causally related to the very weakness of the EU controls over economic
policy, which meant that there was insufficient firepower at the EU
level to stem the tide of sovereign debt or deal with the problem when
the dams broke.
The banking crisis was also indicative of the regulatory failure of
schemes that left too much discretion to member states. In the case of

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2

the financial regulatory regime, as it existed prior to recent reforms, the
crisis was the result of a schema shaped by subsidiarity concerns in the
more technical sense of Article 5(3) TEU. Subsidiarity can manifest
itself in one of three ways: the area may be left to national regulation;
part of the area, such as enforcement, may be left to national regulation;
or the entire area may be subject to EU regulation but with subsidiarity
given voice through discretion left to member states in relation to
various aspects of the policy. The Lamfalussy regime was shot through
to varying degrees with subsidiarity in the second and third senses. The
postmortem as to the inadequacy of the EU response to the banking
crisis was carried out by the de Larosiere Report. 29 The report noted the
lack of cohesiveness in EU policy, and it concluded that the principal
cause stemmed from the options provided to member states in the
enforcement of directives, which was itself the result of the discretion
left to member states by the primary directives that governed the area.
The excessive diversity was manifest in, for example, different
meanings given to "core capital," differing degrees of sectoral
supervision, diverse reporting obligations, distinct accounting provisions
in areas such as pensions, and highly divergent national transposition.
III.

THE UNFOLDING CRISIS AND THE INTERINSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF

POWER
There is, unsurprisingly, debate about the institutional
consequences of the measures taken under the financial crisis, more
especially because there is both a vertical and a horizontal dimension to
this discourse. These concern, respectively, relations between member
states and the European Union, and the interinstitutional balance of
power within the European Union itself-although the issue is rendered
more complex by the fact that there may be interstate tensions within
the fabric of the EU institutions. It is important in approaching this
issue to disaggregate between the institutional consequences as the
crisis unfolded and the remedial measures taken and the
interinstitutional balance of power going forward, now that many of the
key measures are in place. The failure to distinguish the two can lead to
conclusions being made concerning the former, followed by implicit
assumptions that these will inform the pattern of the latter, which is a
non sequitur.

29. See REPORT OF THE DE LAROSItRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION IN THE EU
102-105 (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu
finance/general-policy/docs/de-larosiere-report-en.pdf.
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We can begin, therefore, with the implications of the financial crisis
for EU decision making as the crisis unfolded. Sergio Fabbrini has
provided an insightful analysis of this phase. 30 He contends that, since
the Maastricht Treaty, there have been two modes of decision making
embedded in the treaties: supranational and intergovernmental. The
former was applicable to the single market and other areas, with the
hallmark being the centrality of the Commission, the ordinary
Community method, and an important role for the European Court of
Justice (ECJ). The latter was manifest not only in relation to the Second
and Third Pillar, but also (albeit somewhat differently) in relation to
areas such as economic union, where the hallmark was a greater
concentration of power in the Council and European Council and no role
or a reduced role for the ECJ and substantive Treaty provisions that
were couched in less hard-edged terms. This was exemplified by the
provisions on economic union, where there was much talk of
coordination and cooperation.
This Treaty architecture was then replicated in response to the
financial crisis, in the sense that intergovernmental solutions came to
the forefront to tackle the unfolding drama. Thus, Fabbrini argues that
the apex of the intergovernmental moment was reached between 2009
and mid-2012, when the French and German governments "converged
'1
toward an intergovernmental interpretation of the integration process
in which the EP, Commission, and ECJ were sidelined and decisional
power was concentrated in the European Council and the Economic and
Financial Affairs Committee (ECOFIN). This approach was initially
championed by President Sarkozy, adopted shortly thereafter by
Chancellor Merkel, and supported by the United Kingdom and Italy. It
followed that if operative power was to be conceived in this manner,
then accountability should be primarily left to national parliaments,
rather than the EP.
Sergio
Fabbrini
also
noted
the
shortcomings
of
the
intergovernmental approach to crisis resolution. These included the
"veto dilemma," connoting in this respect the need to ensure consensus
before moving forward, with the consequence that European Council
intervention was often too little or too late; the "enforcement dilemma,"
capturing the difficulty of ensuring that voluntary agreements made
outside the strict letter of the Lisbon Treaty would be applied within
domestic legal orders; and the "compliance dilemma," speaking to the
difficulties of making sure that parties stick to the rules that they have
made. There was, moreover, a "legitimacy dilemma" that pervaded the
30. See Sergio Fabbrini, Intergovernmentalismand Its Limits: Assessing the European
Union's Answer to the Euro Crisis, 46 COMP. POL. STUD. 1, 2 (2013).
31. Id. at 8-9.
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intergovernmental approach, viz., the difficulty of securing the
legitimacy of decisions reached by ECOFIN and the European Council
that had not been discussed or received the imprimatur of the EP.
Fabbrini's analysis ends with the pulling back from the
intergovernmental approach after mid-2012. There is much in this
picture of the institutional response to the unfolding crisis that can be
accepted. There are, however, two countervailing considerations that
qualify this intergovernmental perspective.
First, there is the fact that a central remedial response to the
financial crisis was the six-pack and the two-pack, which were enacted
by the normal legislative procedures as formal regulations and
directives. The ideas were generated in part by the Special Task on EU
Governance, chaired by President Van Rompuy, 32 but the Commission
was not excluded from this process. To the contrary, it exercised the
right of initiative by suggesting the necessary amendments to the
Stability and Growth Pact and drafting and piloting them through the
legislative process. The measures became law in 2010, and the thinking
behind them was already done in 2009. This was, moreover, a legislative
process in which the EP was involved. Now to be sure, there was time
pressure to get the relevant measures on the statute book, which
perforce limited room for EP amendment, but this did not prevent input
from the EP in shaping the emergent legislation. It can be accepted that
the enactment of these measures did not immediately calm the financial
markets, but they were nonetheless central to the shaping of a workable
economic union to accompany monetary union. The other countervailing
consideration to the intergovernmental perspective is the fact that the
single intervention that did more than anything else to calm the
financial markets was that of the ECB president, with the statement
that he would in effect do whatever it took to save the euro.
Much attention has naturally been focused on the supervisory
constraints contained in the Fiscal Compact made outside the confines
of the Lisbon Treaty, which exemplified the intergovernmental method.
However, the reality is that it was significantly watered down over its
successive amendments, such that there is now very little difference
between the supervisory rules contained in the six-pack and two-pack
and those in the Fiscal Compact. It remains to be seen which provides
the principal foundation for oversight of national budgets. The
Commission is in the driving seat for enforcement, and its natural
preference is to use norms legitimated through the ordinary Lisbon
Treaty process. This is for reasons of principle, given that it dislikes

32. See Uwe Puetter, The European Council - The New Centre for EU Politics, 16 EUR.
POL'YANALYSIS 1, 9 (2013).
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"solutions" crafted outside the formal Treaties, more especially when the
results could have been achieved therein and for more pragmatic
reasons, since the modalities of enforcement will normally be clearer in
this sphere.
In addition, it should be recognized that the intergovernmental
location of certain remedial measures was in a real sense "contingent"
rather than "principled," in the sense that it reflected political
practicalities rather than being reflective of a desire to proceed
independently from the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the Fiscal Compact was
not made outside the Lisbon Treaty because the United Kingdom had
vetoed the Treaty amendment. It was made in this way because both
Sarkozy and Merkel-albeit for different domestic political reasonshad promised that there would be reform to the primary Treaty, the
consequence being that when this was blocked, political face had to be
saved by making a separate Treaty. This was notwithstanding that the
desired result could have been achieved within the confines of the
Lisbon Treaty, and notwithstanding the paradoxical fact that
enforcement would have been more secure if this had been done. The
ESM took the form of an international treaty outside the confines of the
Lisbon Treaty for rather different reasons, these being temporal,
namely, that it was felt necessary to establish it before the amendment
to Article 136 TFEU had come into force.
IV. INTERINSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF POWER AND THE NEW LEGAL
MEASURES
The European Union enacted a plethora of measures to address the
financial crisis. They represent "a secular triptych, in which the two
wing panels consist of measures designed respectively to assist and
oversee ailing Member States, while the middle panel is comprised of
current and future initiatives that reveal the interconnection between
33
the two wings."
The European Union put in place a range of measures to provide
"assistance" to member states that were in severe economic trouble as a
result of the Euro-crisis. The most important common element is
conditionality, connoting the basic precept that funds are given on strict
conditions concerning reforms that must be put in place by the recipient
state, with the ESM being the principal mechanism through which such

33. Paul Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: ConstitutionalArchitecture
and Constitutional Implications, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN
BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS 19, 20 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2014).
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assistance is now secured. 34 The ECB has also played a role in providing
assistance, acting pursuant to Article 127(2) TFEU, both in the form of
the securities markets program, which sanctioned ECB intervention in
the Eurozone private and public debt markets, 35 and via the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) which concern transactions in
secondary sovereign bond markets "that aim at safeguarding an
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the
monetary policy." 36 The legal status of this scheme will be determined
by the Court of Justice of the European Union in light of the challenge
raised by the German Federal Constitutional Court.
The other wing of the triptych takes the form of "increased
supervision" over national financial institutions. Thus, the regulatory
apparatus for banking, securities, insurance, and occupational pensions
has been thoroughly overhauled, 37 and new measures have been
introduced, such as the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single
Resolution Mechanism, which have increased EU oversight over
national banking facilities. There were also major changes designed to
increase oversight over national economic policy because of the
proximate connection between economic and monetary union. The
driving force behind these changes was to tighten EU control over
national economic policy in order to prevent the sovereign debt and
banking crises that precipitated the crisis with the euro. The legislative
framework for economic union was amended through the six-pack of
measures in 2011,38 which were enacted pursuant to Articles 121, 126,
and 136 TFEU. 39 The measures were designed to render economic union
34. See Scope of Activity, European Stability Mechanism, http://www.esm.europa.eu
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
35. Decision 2010/281, of the Eur. Cent. Bank of 14 May 2010 on Establishing A
Securities Markets Programme, 2010 O.J. (L 124) 8.
36. See Press Release, Eur. Cent. Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary
Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/
pr120906_1.en.html.
37. Three regulations have created new financial supervisory authorities for the EU,
see Regulation 1095/2010, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 on Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and
Markets Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84; Regulation 1094/2010, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on Establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 2010
O.J. (L 331) 48; Regulation 1093/2010, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 November 2010 on Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority), 2010 O.J. (L331) 12.
38. See EU Economic Governance, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eul
economy-finance/economic-governance/index-en.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
39. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council and to the Eurogroup: Results of In-Depth Reviews Under Regulation (EU) No
1176/2011 on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, at 2, COM
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more effective by tightening the two parts of the schema, surveillance
and excessive deficit, the details of which were contained in the
Stability and Growth Pact.40 Further measures, the two-pack, were
enacted on May 21, 2013.41 The rules on oversight over national
economic policy analysis were also shaped by the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance, 42 also known as the Fiscal Compact,
which was signed by 25 contracting states in March 2012. 4 3 The
provisions concerning assistance and those concerning oversight are
joined at the hip, in the sense that the grant of assistance under the
ESM is conditional from March 1, 2013, on ratification by the applicant
state of the Fiscal Compact.
The middle panel of the secular triptych comprises the set of
measures enacted and proposed that are designed to lay the foundations
for "genuine monetary and economic union." This owes its origins to the
Report produced by the President of the European Council in close
collaboration with the Presidents of the Commission, ECB, and
44
Eurogroup, which may be referred to as the "Four Presidents' Report."
(2013) 199 final (Oct. 4, 2013); Regulation 1173/2011, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance
in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1; Regulation 1174/2011, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive
Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8; Regulation 1175/2011,
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 Amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary
Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 2011 O.J. (L 306)
12; Regulation 1176/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November
2011 on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. (L 306)
25; Council Regulation 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 Amending Regulation (EC) No
1467/97 on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33; Council Directive 2011/85 of 8 November 2011 on
Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the Member States, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 41.
40. See Council Regulation 1466/97, supra note 22, at 1; Council Regulation 1467/97,
supranote 22, at 6.
41. See Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2013 O.J. (L140) 1; Regulation 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 May 2013 O.J. (L140) 11.
42. See generally Paul P. Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty:
Principle, Politics and Pragmatism, 37 EUR. L. REV. 231 (2012) (reviewing the legal
provisions of the TSCG); Steve Peers, The Stability Treaty: PermanentAusterity or Gesture
Politics?,8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 404 (2012) (exploring the relationship of the TSCG with
other EU laws).
43. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union (TSCG), Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/enLdocumentspublications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2012008 [hereinafter TSCG].
44. Herman Van Rompuy et al., Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union
(Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsdatadocs/
pressdata/enec/134069.pdf; see also Communication from the Commission: a Blue Print
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It was produced at the behest of the European Council, 45 and was
endorsed by the Council in December 2012.46 The proposals contained a
blend of assistance and supervision. Thus, some proposals are
principally aimed at provision of assistance that will render it less likely
that member states will need to seek help from the ESM. These
proposals seek to address national economic vulnerability through
"limited, temporary, flexible and targeted financial incentives" 47 made
operational through contractual arrangements between member states
and the European Union, which would be mandatory for EU member
states and voluntary for other member states. They also seek to endow
the European Union with fiscal capacity, the objective being "to
facilitate adjustment to economic shocks." 48 There is also an oversight
and supervisory aspect to the proposals, which finds its expression
principally in the proposals for an integrated financial framework,
including, in this respect, what has become the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
The European Union has readily embraced the new supervisory
mechanisms, as attested to by the speed with which the SSM and SRM
have been moved forward. Progress toward the new assistance
mechanisms has been more halting. This may seem paradoxical, given
the natural intuition that member states would be more willing to
accept assistance than supervision. However, the paradox is more
apparent than real. This is because of the nature of the proposed
assistance and the way in which it is to be made operational. The logic
behind the proposal is in many ways impeccable. If some member states
run persistent economic deficits, then this must be because of deeper
systemic economic problems with their economy, the response to which
is limited, and targeted financial incentives designed to provide
assistance. The financial incentives are made operational through
mutually agreed contracts or something akin thereto that will tailor
receipt of the assistance to conditions designed to alleviate the
underlying economic malaise. While the logic of the proposal may be
impeccable, the effect is that the European Union intervenes ever
for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union Launching A European Debate,
EUROPEAN COMM'N (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/
commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2012/11/pdfblueprint en.pdf.
45. See Conclusions of the European Council- 18/19 October 2012, EUROPEAN COUNCIL
156/12 (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsdata/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf.
46. See Conclusions of the European Council 13/14 December 2012, EUROPEAN
COUNCIL 205/12 (Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsdataldocs/pressdataen/ec/134353.pdf.
47. Van Rompuy, supra note 44, at 9.
48. Id.
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further back into Member State economies, with financial aid
conditioned on tackling the economic malaise in accordance with the
diagnosis reached by the Commission. Member states may be reluctant
to allow this degree of intrusion, since the Commission will largely
dictate the terms. It is therefore not surprising that member states have
recently resisted efforts to take this type of initiative forward. The
impact on the interinstitutional balance of power of these enacted
measures remains to be seen. Political reality can often belie
prognostications made in the advance. We can nonetheless make certain
conjectures in this respect, two of which are relatively obvious, but
important notwithstanding that.
In vertical terms, the EU constraints on national political action,
whether in relation to fiscal policy, banking, or securities regulation,
have increased significantly. The imperative to clear drafts of national
budgets with the European Union before being finalized-to ensure that
they are independently verified, to meet medium term financial targets,
to do so within a particular time frame, and to comply with the
European semester-is the direct result of the new legislative schema.
The resulting macroeconomic union is unrecognizable from its
Maastricht ancestor. These measures to prevent recurrence of a
sovereign debt crisis go hand in hand with SSM, SRM, and the other
features of banking union designed to render financial crisis
precipitated by bank failure less likely. There is therefore no doubt that,
in vertical institutional terms, the European Union restraints on
national political choice, whether exercised by national executives or
parliaments, has increased. The very fact that member states have been
required to put in place measures to comply with their enhanced EU
obligations concerning economic union has also meant that national
parliaments are able to scrutinize national budgets to a greater extent
than hitherto, given that this area has previously been largely regarded
as falling within the province of national executives.
In horizontal terms, the duty to ensure enforcement of and
compliance with the new raft of measures falls primarily to the
Commission and the ECB. It is, inter alia, for this reason that it is
important to distinguish between the interinstitutional dimension when
the measures were being forged from the power balance now that they
are in place. The European Council may well have played a central role
during the former period, but viewed from the latter perspective, the
Commission and ECB occupy center stage. This is readily apparent if
one stands back from the principal measures to deal with the crisis. It is
the Commission that has a central role in relation to the six-pack, twopack, ESM, and Fiscal Compact, and its role will be even greater if and
when other measures are enacted pursuant to the Four Presidents'
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Report. The provisions concerning reverse qualified majority voting in
the six-pack and the Fiscal Compact are a forceful symbolic and
substantive exemplification of this power, but there are numerous other
articles in both sets of measures, as well as the ESM, which accord the
Commission prominence. Nor should this come as a surprise. The
European Council has developed significantly since the Lisbon reforms,
as has its support structure. It does not, however, have the institutional
capacity of the Commission to engage in the kind of systematic and
detailed scrutiny that the new rules require. Moreover, it may be
perfectly content to let the Commission take center stage in this respect,
with the consequence that the latter takes the heat for decisions that
will often not be popular at a national level. This is more especially so
given that the ratchet effect of increased EU economic oversight, with
the Commission in the driving seat, carries dangers for the Commission
itself. Increased power brings increased responsibility. The hardpressed Commission will have to deliver on a whole series of fronts,
which will bring it face-to-face with domestic political imperatives. It is
one thing to write down obligations, whether in Treaty provisions,
legislation, other international treaties, or contracts. It is quite another
to enforce them. The ECB responsibilities have also been significantly
49
enhanced in the financial sector.
In intra-institutional terms, there is more room for disagreement as
to the consequences of the new regime. It is tempting to think of the
larger creditor nations as exercising ever greater dominance over the
debtor and smaller states within bodies such as the European Council
and the Eurogroup. There may well be some truth in this. We should
nonetheless be cautious in this regard for two related reasons. It is not
clear from a temporal perspective whether the degree of such power is
really greater than it was until now, given that the reality was always
that the larger states wielded more power within these institutions.
There are equal difficulties in evaluating precisely how the power
balance between creditor and debtor nations plays out. It is of course
true that the latter will be subject to conditionality terms set in part by
the former. It should, however, also be borne in mind that the creditor
states have foregone for the short term at least funds to aid those states
in difficulty, with the opportunity cost consequences that flow from this.
The intent is that the assistance assumes the form of loans rather than
outright transfers, but whether this reflects reality remains to be seen.
To the extent that it does not, the opportunity cost of the assistance is
all the greater.

49. See Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 O.J. (L287) 63.
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CONCLUSION

The financial crisis has, as stated at the outset, shaken the very
foundations of the European Union and prompted renewed questions
about its legitimacy, decision making, and interinstitutional disposition
of power. It has, however, also revealed the EU's institutional resilience,
its capacity to survive, and its ability to legislate under stress-as
testified by the plethora of measures enacted both within and outside
the Treaty to meet the immediate dangers posed by the crisis and
prevent its recurrence. However, when reflecting on the institutional
responsibility for and implications of the crisis, we should do so in a
symmetrical and balanced manner. This means thinking hard about the
constitutional responsibility of member states in this regard, rather
than working on the explicit or implicit assumption that the fault
resides entirely with the European Union.

